Consider the uplink of a single-cell multiuser MIMO system with a very large number of antennas, M , at the base station (BS) and K single-antenna users. A jamming device equipped with K J antennas transmitting signals attempts to degrade the transmission between the users and the BS. In this paper, we propose a detection algorithm of the jamming attack as well as a method for its rejection. The proposed results are based on the application of results from random matrix theory. We assume that K and K J are fixed as M converges to infinity while the coherence interval τ is assumed to be of the same order of magnitude as M .
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive MIMO is an emerging technology allowing to improve the spectral efficiency of wireless communication systems and has been considered as a key candidate for the next generation wireless systems. In addition to an improved spectral and energy efficiency, other advantages of massive MIMO are enhanced reliability and reduced interference [1] . Moreover, due to the large number of degrees of freedom offered in massive MIMO, its robustness to jamming attacks was conjectured in [1] . Indeed, a promising analysis of jamming and eavesdropping attacks was conducted in [2] , [3] . It was shown in [3] that the secure degree of freedom achieved in the presence of jamming and eavesdropping attacks is the same as under no attack. Nevertheless, it was pointed out (see, e.g., [2] , [3] ) that massive MIMO is particularly vulnerable to attacks during the pilot transmission phase making the channel estimation highly degraded. This is referred to as a pilot contamination attack.
In downlink transmission, the effect of pilot contamination attacks was analysed in [3] . It was shown in [3] that a maximum secure degree of freedom is zero when the pilot signals are jammed. In uplink, the impact of smart jamming optimally allocating its power budget to jam the pilot and data transmission was studied in [4] demonstrating a spectacular loss in the sum spectral efficiency when the BS acts as if there is no jamming. One of the most relevant challenges in dealing with jamming attacks is their detection because the jammer can smartly adapt its transmission power in order to avoid to be observed. However, even if its presence is 978-1-5090-1749-2/16/$31.00 c 2016 IEEE detected, mitigation of the jamming impact is still an open problem in massive MIMO.
In this paper, we propose two algorithms:
1) Jamming detection: a multiple hypothesis testing approach is taken in order to detect the presence of the jamming attack by analyzing the spectrum of the received sample covariance matrix; 2) Jamming mitigation: the eigensubspace corresponding to the K users is identified from the received sample covariance matrix, and the received signal is projected to this subspace to mitigate jamming.
The proposed algorithms are based on the application of some known results from random matrix theory. More specifically, our approach is based on the assumption of a fixed number of users and fixed number of jamming antennas as M converges to infinity.
Notations: The superscript (·)
H is the Hermitian transpose of a matrix. We denote by a.s.
− − → the almost sure (a.s.) convergence. We denote by CN (a, Σ) the multivariate complex normal distribution with mean a and covariance matrix Σ.
II. TRANSMISSION SCENARIO
Consider a single-cell multiuser MIMO system containing a BS equipped with M antennas and K single-antenna users. This is depicted in Fig. 1 where there are also K J distributed (or co-located) single-antenna jamming devices.
III. PRELIMINARIES
The approach of this paper is based on results on the largest eigenvalues' behavior of large-dimensional random matrices. Let us first consider the matrix W ∈ C M ×τ with i.i.d. entries such that W m,t ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ). It is well known (see, e.g., [5] ) that as M → ∞, such that M/τ → c > 0, the spectrum of the sample covariance matrix 
whereF TW is the complementary Tracy-Widom (TW) distribution and
In the next sections, W will correspond to the noise and Theorem 1 will be useful to define a detection test.
Let now W be perturbed by a low rank matrix A ∈ C M ×τ (deterministic or random) of fixed rank L as M → ∞ and consider the matrix Y = A+W. This model is referred to as a spiked model and the spectrum of 1 τ YY H still converges to 1 We assume that the pathlosses β 1 , . . . , β K between the users and the BS and γ 1 , . . . , γ K J between the jamming devices and the BS are absorbed into P and P J , respectively. the MP law [8] . However, some eigenvalues can drop out on the right side of the interval [a, b] under some conditions on the singular values of A. The following theorem describes the behavior of the L largest eigenvalues of 
From Theorem 2, if the singular value a l of the perturbation matrix is large enough, the corresponding sample covariance eigenvalueλ l will converge to the limit ρ l which is located outside (on the right side) of the MP law's support. Note also that the limit ρ l depends on a 2 l , σ 2 , and on the limiting ratio c. In this paper, the perturbation matrix A will correspond to the sum of the signal and of the jamming matrices, as these will be of fixed ranks as M → ∞. This is discussed in more details in the next section where a detection of the jamming attack is proposed.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION
In this section we propose an algorithm to detect the presence of a jamming attack.
IV-A. Problem statement
We denote by H 0 the null hypothesis under which there is no attack and by H 1 the alternative hypothesis where there is a jammer. The hypothesis testing problem is given by:
Considering the transmission scenario of Section II and concatenating the received vectors y t ∈ C M ×1 at BS for t = 1, . . . , τ , we obtain the following hypothesis test:
√ c/M , meaning that the received powers from all the users' and jammer's antennas are large enough so they generate K + K J isolated eigenvalues (see Theorem 2) . Otherwise, the user and the jamming signals are negligible compared to the noise and can be ignored. This is observed in Fig. 2 where under H 0 we have K = 2 signal eigenvalues and under H 1 there are K + K J = 4 signal-plus-jamming eigenvalues. 
IV-B. Estimation of the jamming subspace
We propose first to estimate the jamming subspace dimension. From Theorem 1, in the absence of the signal and the jammer, the distribution of the largest eigenvalue of the noise covariance matrix converges to a centered and scaled TW distribution as M → ∞. This motivates us to perform a multiple hypothesis testing similarly to the approach of [10] which was proposed in a different context of source enumeration. Letλ 1 ≥ . . . ≥λ M be the eigenvalues of R and assume σ 2 known at the BS. Since it is assumed that P K > σ 2 √ c/M , there will be at least K isolated eigenvalues corresponding to the signals. Hence, it is sufficient to start the test from the (K + 1)th largest eigenvalue. We consider the following hypothesis testing, for k = K + 1, . . . , M :
where at each sequence of hypothesis test, the kth largest eigenvalue of R is tested. The hypothesis H 0 is rejected if λ k is too large:λ
where ξ is the detection threshold, which is a function of the false alarm rate denoted by α, defined by ξ(α) b + τ −2/3F −1 T W (α)σ withσ given in Theorem 1. The testing is stopped at the smallest index k such thatλ k < ξ(α). Note that it was shown in [10] , under hypothesis H 0 of k − 1 − K jamming signals,λ k approximately follows the centered and scaled Tracy-Widom as the influence of the first k − 1 jamming and/or users' signals can be neglected.
Based on the above discussions, we can now define the estimate of the jamming space dimension K J given bŷ √ c/M .
IV-C. Jamming detection
We rewrite now the hypothesis testing problem of (1) as:
It is now straightforward to conclude that an attack is declared ifK J ≥ 1 and absence of an attack in the case wherê K J = 0. The performance of this detector is analyzed in the simulation part and is compared to a classical information theoretic criteria-based approach.
V. JAMMIMG REJECTION
In this section we consider the model (1) under hypothesis H 1 where the jamming attack is present and develop an algorithm to reject interference.
unknown. Let q 1 , . . . , q K be the indices of the eigenvalues corresponding to the K users. From Theorem 2, for k = 1, . . . , K, as M → ∞, we havê
We propose now to identify the K eigenvalues among the K + K J eigenvalues corresponding to the users. Define the normalized mean square error (NMSE) of the kth eigenvalue, for k = 1, . . . , K + K J , as
We denote by i k the index of the eigenvalue having the i k th smallest NMSE. As all the users' and jammer's powers are assumed to be distinct, the indices corresponding to the K smallest NMSE (and hence corresponding to the K users' eigenvalues) are given by
. . .
Denote byû i1 , . . . ,û i K the eigenvectors of R corresponding to the eigenvaluesλ i1 ≥ . . . ≥λ i K . We define the orthogonal projector Π ∈ C M ×K on the signal subspace generated byû i1 , . . . ,û i K as
V-B. Subspace projected channel estimation
We consider the transmission over the coherence interval τ where τ p is the duration of the pilot sequence such that τ p ≥ K and τ d = τ −τ p is the duration of the data sequence. We recall that in this case the transmission model is given by
where now X = [X p X d ] with X p ∈ C K×τp the matrix of orthogonal pilots such that X p X 1 2 .
V-C. Performance analysis
We analyze the performance in terms of spectral efficiency under linear detection. A spectral efficiency [12] for user k = 1, . . . , K is given by
K×τ d is the filtered received vector for user k. An approximate minimum mean square error (MMSE) detection filter for user k = 1, . . . , K is given by
whereĥ k ∈ C K×1 is the kth column of H.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we provide simulation results for K = 2 and K J = 2 with equal received user powers (P 1 = P 2 = P ) and equal received jamming powers (P
. We analyze first the performance of the proposed jamming detection algorithm. The probability of false alarm is set to α = 0.01 and the hypothesis test given by (2) is performed. In Fig. 3 , the correct detection rates (CDR) versus P J (dB) for different τ are plotted for P = −10 dB. The results are compared to the minimum description length (MDL) [13] method relying on the closeness of the M − (K + K J ) noise eigenvalues of R. We observe that the proposed algorithm outperforms the MDL approach by 5 dB meaning that weaker jamming signals can be detected.
In Figs. 4-5, the performance of the jamming rejection algorithm (Proposed I) from Section V is shown in terms of spectral efficiency (bits/s/Hz) and compared to the spectral efficiency obtained in the following scenarios: (i) Jamming (under attack); (ii) Jamming free case (no attack); (iii) Proposed II case (the rejection algorithm is applied to the jamming free model). In Fig. 4 the spectral efficiency for one user (1 or 2) is plotted versus SNR = P/σ 2 (dB) whereas in Fig. 5 they are drawn versus P J (dB). In all plots similar behaviors are observed where the performance of the proposed algorithm is drastically degraded when P and P J are close. This is explained by the fact that when P = P J , the corresponding signal and jamming isolated eigenvalues converge to the same limit and hence, the signal subspace cannot be well estimated and separated from the jamming. Notice however that at low SNR (or low P J ) the proposed method shows a particularly better performance than both the jamming case and the case where no attack is present. Indeed, the rejection algorithm rejects not only the jamming but also the noise by projecting the received signal to the signal subspace. In summary, the proposed method displays a very good performance when P ≫ P J or P J ≫ P . The latter shows that a dumb jammer that uses very high power can easily be rejected. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The results confirm the vulnerability of massive MIMO to attacks in the pilot transmission phase. Nevertheless, the BS can detect the jamming and reject it when the power levels of the desired signals and jamming are sufficiently different. We observed that if the jammer smartly adjusts its transmission power to match the desired signals, the spectral efficiency is drastically affected. This motivates to analyze the effect of other configurations of jamming devices, in particular, massive jamming with a large number of (un)coordinated antennas K J , of the same order of magnitude as M .
